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While no area of constitutional law can ever truly be said to be settled,
the law bearing on the ability of Parliament and the legislatures of the prov-
inces to regulate the non-medical use of drugs is now in a particularly fluid
state. Until very recently, the criminal law power was generally thought to be
the principal, if not the only, source of federal authority to regulate the use
of drugs. But in Regina v. Hauser,' a four judge majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the Narcotic Control Act2 was to be regarded as
enacted not under section 91(27) of the British North America Act3 but
under the federal Parliament's residual power "to make laws for the peace,
order and good government of Canada."'4 Since the criminal law power and
the p.o.g.g. power are powers of a very different nature, the decision in
Hauser may have altered not only the source but also the scope of federal
competence, and by implication may have affected as well the room which
remains for provincial legislative initiatives.
However, as will be seen below, Hauser may not have finally determined
the question of the source of federal power to legislate for the control of drug
use. Therefore, and in order to be able to assess the case and its significance,
the article begins with an outline of the federal criminal law power and its
limitations. After a discussion of Hauser and other relevant federal powers,
it proceeds to consider the sources of authority available to provincial
legislatures.
II. THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW POWER
A. Nature of the Power
The contours of federal authority under section 91(27) of the B.N.A.
Act have resisted easy definition. There are, however, a few propositions
concerning the scope of the criminal law power which can be stated with
relative certainty.
The first is that Parliament is not confined to making criminal what was
criminal at the time of Confederation. That proposition was once disputed;
1 R. v. Hauser et al., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984, 98 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 46 C.C.C. (2d)
481.
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1.
3 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, (U.K.) [hereinafter referred to as B.N.A. Act]. Section
91(27) confers authority in relation to matters coming within "the criminal law, except
the constitution of courts of criminal jurisdiction, but including the procedure in criminal
matters."
4 B.N.A. Act, s. 91:
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
and House of Commons, to make laws for the peace, order and good government
of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by
this Act assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the Provinces ...
In accordance with conventional usage, this portion of s. 91 and the power which it
confers are referred to hereinafter as the "p.o.g.g. clause" and "p.o.g.g. power" respec-
tively.
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in Re Board of Commerce Act,5 the Privy Council held that the power was
co-extensive with the traditional "domain of criminal jurisprudence." But
since a later decision of the Judicial Committee in which federal competition
legislation was held valid, it is clear that section 91(27) will support "legis-
lation to make new crimes."0
It is also clear that, to be valid as criminal law, a federal statute must
possess certain formal characteristics; it must be largely prohibitory in form,
and impose penalties on those who violate its prohibitions. In the Proprietary
Articles Trade Association case, the Privy Council went so far as to suggest
that the formula of prohibition and penalty was not merely a necessary but
a sufficient condition for a law to come within section 91(27). 7 If only be-
cause the provinces are expressly authorized to enact punitive laws,8 that
position was untenable, and the Supreme Court of Canada has since em-
phasized that the purpose of the law, as well as its form, must be looked to in
determining whether it is criminal law in the constitutional sense. There must
be "some evil or injurious or undesirable effect upon the public against which
the law is directed," and the prohibition must be "enacted with a view to a
public purpose which can support it as being in relation to criminal law."
The purpose might be "[p]ublic peace, order, security, health, morality: these
are the ordinary though not exclusive ends served by that law. .. 2,9
As the breadth of these terms indicates, the criminal law power, even
after the Supreme Court's rejection of the purely formal test of P.A.T.A., can
scarcely be regarded as a narrow one, particularly in view of the judicial
tendency to defer to Parliament's assessment of what is "socially undesirable
conduct"' 0 deserving of prohibition. Still, not all punitive legislation, even
apart from that enacted by the provinces under the authority of section
92(15), is classifiable for constitutional purposes as criminal law. Offences
contained in such statutes as the Income Tax Act" and the Railway Act 2 are
more properly seen as enforcement provisions owing their validity to the same
heads of power that underlie the statutes themselves.'"
Beyond this point, just what are the boundaries of the criminal law
5 Re Board of Commerce Act, 1919 and Combines and Fair Prices Act, [1922] 1
A.C. 191 at 199, [1922] 1 W.W.R. 20 at 25, 60 D.L.R. 513 at 518 (P.C.).
6Proprietary Articles Trade Ass'n. v. A.G. Can., [1931] A.C. 310 at 324, [1931] 2
D.L.R. 1 at 9, 55 C.C.C. 241 at 249 (P.C.) [hereinafter P.A.T.A.].
7Jd.
8B.N.A. Act, s. 92(15), conferring authority in relation to "the imposition of
punishment by fine, penalty, or imprisonment for enforcing any law of the province."
9 Reference as to the Validity of S. 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. I
at 49-50, [1949] 1 D.L.R. 433 at 473 per Rand J., aff'd [1951] A.C. 179, [1950] 4 D.L.R.
689 (sub nom. Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. A.G. Que.).
10 Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616 at 627, 53 D.L.R.(3d) 161 at
169, 20 C.C.C.(2d) 449 at 457 per Laskin CJ.C.
11 R.S.C. 1952, c. 148.
121RS.C. 1970, c. R-2.
1 See R. v. Parrot (1979), 27 O.R.(2d) 333 at 346, 51 C.C.C.(2d) 539 at 553
(C.A.).
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power becomes a matter of much greater controversy. Three areas of dispute
are of particular concern if federal authority in relation to drug use is still to
be supported as stemming at least in part from section 91 (27). These are the
ability of the criminal law power to support measures aimed more at treat-
ment than at punishment, that power's status as a source of regulatory au-
thority, and the extent to which it precludes provinces from legislating on
matters traditionally within the purview of the criminal law.
B. Treatment Legislation as Criminal Law
Federal drug legislation has traditionally taken a punitive, rather than a
treatment-oriented approach. Whatever its merits as a policy towards drug
use, such an approach may be the only one permissible so long as Parliament
must rely on section 91(27). Ordinarily, treatment connotes concern with a
medical condition, and, as will be seen below,14 health is largely a provincial
responsibility under the B.N.A. Act division of powers. While, in 1961,
Parliament did enact Part II of the Narcotic Control Act,15 providing for
preventive detention and compulsory treatment of persons convicted under
the Act, the legislation has never been brought into force, for reasons which
may or may not have to do with anticipated constitutional difficulties.'" How-
ever, Parliament's ability under section 91(27) to prescribe sanctions for
criminal offences may well provide a constitutional base for federal compul-
sory treatment legislation. If treatment could be characterized as a sentence
imposed on conviction of a criminal offence, such legislation would be justifi-
able as an exercise of the criminal law power. In Regina v. Zelensky, 17 the
Supreme Court of Canada recently upheld on that ground the compensation
provision of the Criminal Code.
The constitutional issue arose in Zelensky after the accused had pleaded
guilty to theft from her employer of some $18,000 in money and some
$7,000 in goods. She was given a prison sentence, and in addition, on the
application of the employer, the convicting judge made an order for com-
pensation and for restitution of the stolen property. In appealing the sentence,
she argued that section 653 of the Code, which authorized the compensation
order, was ultra vires; it was not truly a criminal penalty but in the nature of
a civil remedy, open only to the provinces to enact under their power re-
specting property and civil rights.
Writing for the majority in a six to three decision, Laskin C.J.C. em-
phasized that section 91(27) was flexible enough to accommodate new
legislative responses to crime:
We cannot.., approach the validity of s. 653 as if the fields of criminal law and
criminal procedure and the modes of sentencing have been frozen as of some
particular time. New appreciations thrown up by new social conditions, or re-
assessments of old appreciations which new or altered social conditions induce
14 See text accompanying notes 160-68, infra.
15 S.C. 1960-61, c. 35, ss. 15-19.
10 Can., Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of
Drugs (LeDain Report) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1974) at 924.
17 R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940, 86 D.L.R.(3d) 179, 41 C.C.C.(2d) 97.
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make it appropriate for this Court to re-examine courses of decision on the scope
of legislative power when fresh issues are presented to it .... 18
The Chief Justice answered the contention that the provision exceeded Parlia-
ment's authority by fixing on the relationship between offender compensation
of victims of crime and the accepted objects of sentencing. As "part and
parcel of the sentencing process," section 653 was supportable as criminal
law.
19
Can the same be said of legislation requiring drug offenders to undergo
a course of treatment? Certainly the reform and rehabilitation of offenders
has been a dominant theme in the Canadian law of sentencing, despite much
current skepticism as to the likelihood of its achievement.2 0 Compulsory treat-
ment legislation would presumably be directed toward that end; the unpro-
claimed Part II of the Narcotic Control Act was described by the then Minister
of Justice as based on "the conclusion that what is needed is a concentrated
effort to reform and rehabilitate rather than simply to incarcerate."2 1
The LeDain Commission disputed the view that treatment shares the
purposes of criminal law sentencing.2 2 It pointed out that in the regime con-
templated by Part II, treatment would be imposed not as punishment for
the offence of which the accused was convicted, but for the very condition
of addiction. Moreover,
[in the case of imprisonment, it is rehabilitation of the offender qua criminal that
is sought, not the cure of a medical condition. At the end of his term the offender
must be released, whether he is actually rehabilitated or not. Confinement for an
indeterminate period for the treatment of addiction implies that the addict will not
be released until he is deemed to be cured. His criminal propensities are neither
here nor there; it is his medical condition that is in issue.m
While at first glance telling, this criticism appears more aptly directed
to the particular provisions of Part II than to the general problem of treat-
ment as a criminal law disposition. If there is dissonance between sentence
and offence, it can be rectified not only by ruling out the sentence but also by
reconstituting the offence. As the Commission concedes, 24 there is no consti-
tutional objection in Canada to imposing punishment for a status or condi-
tion;25 the Supreme Court has upheld, for example, the Criminal Code pro-
visions imposing indeterminate sentences on those found to be dangerous
a8Id. at 951 (S.C.R.), 186 (D.L.R.), 104 (C.C.C.) per Laskin C.J.C.
19 Id. at 960 (S.C.R.), 193 (D.L.R.), 111 (C.C.C.).
2 0 See Ruby, Sentencing (2d ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 13, 16.
21 Can.: H. of C. Debates, June 7, 1961, at 5983-84. In the United States, there
have been efforts to characterize compulsory treatment as punishment for the purpose
of subjecting it to judicial review under the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of
U.S. Const., amend. VIII; see Note, Aversion Therapy: Punishment as Treatment and
Treatment as Cruel and Unusual Punishment (1976), 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 880 at 946-59.
22 Supra note 16, at 923-28.
23 Id. at 926.
24 Id. at 924.
25 The position is otherwise in the United States: Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.(2d) 758 (1962).
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offenders.26 If Parliament were forthrightly to declare addiction to be a
criminal condition, 27 compulsory treatment could more readily be charac-
terized as a sentence appropriate to the "crime." The Juvenile Delinquents
Act, 8 whose constitutionality has also been expressly affirmed, 29 already pur-
ports to deal with status or condition offenders through therapeutic means.30
And insanity, though strictly speaking vitiates the commission of an offence,
is dealt with under the Code as a medical condition for which confinement
must be ordered.
3'
It would not, however, be necessary to go so far as to create a status
offence of addiction for Parliament to rely on the preventive aspect of the
criminal law power to support the validity of a treatment regime. Though
Parliament may not legislate for crime prevention in the abstract, independent
of the criminal process, 32 both offences and sentences have been constitu-
tionally validated on the basis that they would serve to prevent future crime.33
The Supreme Court has described the Juvenile Delinquents Act, for example,
as "intended to prevent these juveniles to become prospective criminals and
to assist them to be law-abiding citizens," and referred to those objectives as
"clearly within the judicially defined field of criminal law."134
It has been suggested, however, that similar reasoning cannot apply to a
program of compulsory treatment; that "while compulsory treatment may
have the consequential effect of preventing or reducing crime it is directed to
the elimination of a medical condition." 35 But once the consequential rela-
tionship between addiction and crime is established-and there is little doubt
both that it has been in general30 and that it can be in individual cases-that
should be enough, particularly given the leeway which the courts have allowed
Parliament under section 91(27), to justify legislation for treating addiction
as a means of crime prevention. There is a possible model in section 236(2)
26 Brusch v. The Queen, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 373, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 707, 105 C.C.C. 110;
R. v. Neil, [1957] S.C.R. 685, 11 D.L.R.(2d) 545, 119 C.C.C. 1. Provision for dan-
gerous offenders is now found in ss. 687-95.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.
C-34.
2 7 The unproclaimed s. 17 of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-i, which
authorizes a finding "that the convicted person is a narcotic addict," comes very close to
such a declaration.
28 R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3.
NA.G.B.C. v. Smith, [1967] S.C.R. 702, 65 D.L.R.(2d) 82, [1969] 1 C.C.C. 244.
30 There is technically an offence of "delinquency," but it encompasses behaviour
that is not otherwise a violation of any law; a child found to have committed the
offence is required to be dealt with "as one in a condition of delinquency and therefore
requiring help and guidance and proper supervision": R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3, ss. 2(1), 3.
31 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 545-46.
32 Cf. MacDonald v. Vapour Can. Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134 at 146, 66 D.L.R.(3d)
I at 10, 22 C.P.R.(2d) 1 at 13.
33 See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 303, [1956]
2 D.L.R.(2d) 11, 114 C.C.C. 380.
34 Supra note 29, at 710 (S.C.R.), 88 (D.L.R.), 251 (C.C.C.).
85 Supra note 16, at 927.
36 See, e.g., Cushman, Relationship Between Narcotic Addiction and Crime (1974),
38 Fed. Prob. 38.
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of the Criminal Code, which now authorizes a court, rather than convicting
an accused of an alcohol-related driving offence, to discharge him on condi-
tion that he attend "for curative treatment in relation to his consumption of
alcohol. '37 In drug-related offences, treatment could be required either as
the sentence itself or as a condition of probation or discharge.
It should perhaps be mentioned that constitutional validity is not the
only legal hurdle which federal treatment legislation must confront. Also
relevant is the Canadian Bill of Rights,38 which in section 2(b) provides that
"no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to ... impose or
authorize the imposition of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment." In
the United States, the Supreme Court has found violative of the similarly-
worded Eighth Amendment a state statute under which addiction was a
crime, though in doing so it indicated that a non-criminal compulsory treat-
ment program for addicts would not offend constitutional safeguards even if
it required involuntary confinement. 39
Experience with the Canadian Bill of Rights, however, suggests that it is
unlikely that it would prevent the operation of a federal treatment scheme.
Both generally, 40 and in cases arising under section 2(b), 41 the Supreme
Court of Canada has shown extreme reluctance to overturn the judgment of
Parliament that legislative measures are warranted. It has upheld the Criminal
Code dangerous offender provisions without serious question,42 and even
in its most expansive reading of section 2 (b), would apply it only to penalties
which demonstrably serve no social purpose.43
C. Regulating Drug Use through the Criminal Law
There are many areas of activity in which simple prohibitions may be
too blunt an instrument to achieve purposes otherwise associated with the
criminal law. Increasingly, in the Criminal Code itself, Parliament has tem-
pered prohibitions with regulated exceptions,44 and the Supreme Court has
indicated that there exists some scope to do so while staying within the
bounds of section 91(27). Though the criminal law power will not support
legislative schemes whose primary purpose is regulatory, particularly where
2 7 The validity of this provision does not appear to have been challenged since its
enactment by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 17.
38 R.S.C. 1970, App. III.
39 Supra note 25, at 665-66 (U.S.), 1419-20 (S.Ct.), 762-63 (L.Ed.).
4
D See, e.g., Curr v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 889 at 899, 26 D.L.R.(3d) 603 at
613, 7 C.C.C.(2d) 181 at 191 per Laskin J.
41 Miller v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680, [1977] 70 D.L.R.(3d) 324, 31 C.C.C.
(2d) 177; Ex pare Matticks, 15 C.C.C.(2d) 213 (S.C.C.); R. v. Shand, [1977] 70
D.L.R.(3d) 395, 13 O.R.(2d) 65, 30 C.C.C.(2d) 23 (C.A.) (leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused).
42 Ex parte Matticks, id.
43 Miller, supra note 41, at 697 (S.C.R.), 337 (D.L.R.), 190 (C.C.C.) per Laskin
C.J.C.
44 See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 186-90 (gambling), 251
(abortion).
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they are to be implemented through a regulatory apparatus, 45 "Parliament
may determine what is not criminal as well as what is, and may hence intro-
duce dispensations or exemptions in its criminal legislation. '46 The Court has
recently emphasized, however, that regulations themselves must have a crimi-
nal law purpose to be justified as criminal law; that their violation is made
an offence is not enough to give them validity.47
Federal drug law in Canada has never truly been a body of simple pro-
hibitions; the first exemption was granted when the first statute was enacted in
1908.48 Today, the prohibitions of both the Narcotic Control Act49 and the
controlled and restricted drugs provisions of the Food and Drugs Act5° are
overlaid by elaborate regulations which establish terms under which drugs
may be used and distributed for scientific or medical purposes. 51 A long list
of matters is exactingly prescribed: licensing, packaging and labelling, dis-
pensing and administering of drugs by pharmacists, medical practitioners and
hospitals, record-keeping, reporting and inspection.
Yet the complexity of the regulations alone should not push them beyond
the pale of the criminal law power so long as they are animated by the tradi-
tional concerns of the criminal law.52 That they are seems hardly open to
question; the overriding consideration is an assessment of the drugs' potential
for harm, an assessment which takes into account their utility or necessity
for medical purposes.53 The regulations then qualify the prohibitions to the
extent this assessment dictates, but in the end, the qualifications remain much
more the exception than the rule.
However, any future attenuation of the regulations' focus on public harm
would be likely to jeopardize their constitutionality so long as it is founded
on the criminal law power. The Margarine Reference54 provides a notable
example of a federal enactment, originally justified as the regulation of a
harmful substance, losing its validity as criminal law when the substance was
acknowledged to be harmless.
There now appears little probability of any similar acknowledgment with
respect to drugs such as cannabis.55 But if Parliament attempted to establish
a distribution system for drugs on the basis that they were completely innocu-
45 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 289.
4
0 Supra note 10.
47 Labatt Breweries v. A.G. Can., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 914 at 933, 110 D.L.R.(3d) 594
at 618.
4 8 An Act to prohibit the importation, manufacture and sale of opium for other than
medicinal purposes, S.C. 1908, c. 50.
49 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1.
50 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27.
51 Narcotic Control Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 1041; Food and Drug Regulations,
C.R.C. 1978, c. 870, Parts G and J. For a description of the scheme of the regulations,
see, supra note 16, at 71-79.
52 Labatt Breweries, supra note 47.
53 See, supra note 16, at 80.
5 4 Supra note 9.
55 Only a reduction in the severity of penalties for certain offences is now contem-
plated: The Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 15, 1980.
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ous for recreational use, it would almost certainly go beyond the limits of
section 91(27). If, however, the system maintained controls designed to pro-
hibit drug use for purposes still considered to be harmful, different considera-
tions would apply. A criminal law purpose would continue to be present, and
would likely validate the system. Even a federal government monopoly of
production and distribution could be justified as the regulation of a harmful
substance,-5 despite the courts' particular sensitivity to the use of the criminal
law power as a means of trade regulation. 57
D. The Criminal Law Power and Provincial Jurisdiction
Since the powers conferred by the B.N.A. Act on Parliament and the
provinces are mutually exclusive, the presence of section 91(27) among the
federal heads of power in turn precludes the provincial legislatures from
enacting criminal law. In practical terms, however, the exclusivity of federal
criminal law authority has now all but disappeared. That it has may be due
in large part to the expansive nature of the power-virtually all legislation
can be said to be directed at "socially undesirable conduct" 58-and to the
inclusion in the provincial catalogue of powers of an explicit, though deriva-
tive, penal authority.59
Whatever the precise reasons, there has been an increasing tendency to
validate provincial legislation which is both enacted for criminal law purposes
and essentially prohibitory in character, so long as it can be linked up with
an ostensible provincial purpose. The trend is best exemplified by two recent
cases in the Supreme Court of Canada. In McNeil,60 the Court upheld a
provincial film censorship law under which films could be prohibited on moral
grounds, even though obscenity in films is dealt with under the Criminal
Code. Its purpose, said the Court, was to regulate the film business and trans-
actions in films, or in the alternative, to enforce local standards of morality,
a matter of a "local and private nature in the province."' In Dupond,0 2 the
law sustained prohibited all demonstrations in city streets and parks for a
specified period as a means of preserving public order. It too was held to be
addressed to a matter of a local nature, and to derive validity as well from
an assortment of other provincial powers.0
The powers which are available to support provincial laws concerning
drug use are considered in some detail below.0 4 What is important at this
GO See, supra note 16, at 920.
57 See, e.g., A.G. Ont. v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 789,
41 C.C.C. 336 (P.C.).
58 Supra note 10.
59 B.N.A. Act, s. 92(15), quoted, supra note 8.
GO Nova Scotia Bd. of Censors v. McNeil, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662, 84 D.L.R.(3d) 1,
44 C.C.C.(2d) 316.
61 Id. at 688, 699 (S.C.R.), 20, 28 (D.L.R.), 337, 346 (C.C.C.).
62 Dupond v. City of Montreal, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770, 84 D.L.R.(3d) 420, 5
M.P.L.R. 4.
31Id. at 792 (S.C.R.), 436 (D.L.R.), 28 (M.P.L.R.).
64 See text accompanying notes 179 if., infra.
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juncture is that federal criminal authority in relation to drugs, or even actual
criminal legislation on the subject, by no means precludes provinces from
enacting drug legislation for provincial purposes. It is an axiom of Canadian
constitutional law that "subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall
within sect. 92, may in another aspect and for another purpose fall within
sect. 91."05 But perhaps more than ever before, there is a judicial willingness
to recognize provincial "aspects" in legislation which would otherwise appear
to be criminal, on the theory that the provinces "may constitutionally com-
plement federal legislation."' 0 It follows that from the point of view of the
criminal law power, any future federal withdrawal from an area of drug
regulation will not guarantee a legal vacuum.
III. REGINA v. HA USER: FROM CRIMINAL LAW TO PEACE,
ORDER AND GOOD GOVERNMENT
A. The Decision in Hauser
At issue in the Hauser case 7 was the authority to prosecute offences
under the Narcotic Control Act. An amendment to the federal Criminal Code
in 19698 precipitated the dispute. Before the amendment, an arrangement
had been in place under which prosecutions, while nominally brought by the
provincial attorneys general as then required by the Code, were instituted in
fact by agents of the federal attorney general, acting with provincial con-
sent. 9 The amendment was to the statutory definition of attorney general,
and purported to confer the power to prosecute offences other than Criminal
Code offences directly on the federal attorney general and his agents.
The case was largely argued-and decided in the lower courtsT°-as a
test of the limits of the federal criminal law power. The federal position was
that section 91(27), which refers to "the procedure in criminal matters" as
well as to "the criminal law "itself, encompassed the authority to determine
how criminal offences should be prosecuted. Nine provinces71 advanced the
contrary view that prosecutions in criminal matters were an essential element
of the administration of criminal justice, and were therefore solely for the
provinces to prescribe. The Supreme Court had earlier held that section
92(14) of the B.N.A. Act, under which "the administration of justice in the
province? is within exclusive provincial competence, includes not only civil
but also criminal justice.72 As in virtually all constitutional cases, the com-
peting textual arguments reflected strongly-held views as to the appropriate
05 Hodge v. The Queen (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117, 50 L.T. 301, 3 Cart. 144 (P.C.).
66 Dupond, supra note 62, at 794 (S.C.R.), 437 (D.L.R.), 29 (M.P.L.R.).
67 Supra note 1.
08 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69, S.C. 1968-69, c. 38, s. 2.
09 The arrangement is described in the dissenting judgment of Dickson J., supra
note 1, at 1006 (S.C.R.), 211 (D.L.R.), 499 (C.C.C.).
70 Re Hauser and the Queen (1977), 80 D.L.R.(3d) 161, 6 W.W.R. 501, 37 C.C.C.
(2d) 129 (Alta. App. Div.).
71 All but Manitoba.
72 Dilorio v. Warden of Common Jail, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 152, 73 D.L.R.(3d) 491,
35 C.R.N.S. 57.
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federal-provincial balance. For the provinces, sustaining the federal amend-
ment would subvert the compromise agreed to at Confederation, which com-
bined the uniformity of a national criminal law with regional sensitivity in its
administration. For the federal government, striking it down would jeopardize
the enforcement of substantive rules which Parliament is clearly competent
to enact.7
3
Rather than deciding the question of responsibility for prosecuting crimi-
nal offences, the majority of the Court chose in effect to finesse it. The
Narcotic Control Act, the Court held, was not, for constitutional purposes,
criminal law; Parliament derived the authority to enact it not from its criminal
law power but from its residual authority to legislate "for the peace, order
and good government of Canada.' 7 4 Since federal power other than under
section 91(27) could not be limited by the provincial responsibility for the
administration of criminal justice, there could be no constitutional obstacle to
the substitution of a federal for a provincial prosecutor in narcotics offences.75
To say that this conclusion was surprising in light of previous authority
may be the least of the criticisms that can be made of it. But that authority,
which was marshalled compellingiy by Dickson J. in dissent,76 had consistent-
ly treated the Narcotic Control Act and its predecessor legislation as an ex-
ercise of the power conferred by section 91 (27). For example, in the 1953
case of Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. The Queen,7 the Supreme Court had
held valid as criminal law the provision of the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act
for forfeiture of property used in the commission of drug offences.78 It had
earlier been held in a lower court that "[t]he primary object [of the Act] was
to create a crime and afford punishment for its infraction."70
Certainly a criminal law characterization appears consistent with the
overall prohibitory and public harm thrust of the policy which the statute
embodies,80 and with the severity of the penalties which it prescribes. In the
related context of adulteration legislation, the protection of the public against
injurious substances-which requires more than straightforward prohibitions
73 Dickson J., who dissented, was attracted by the former position; Spence J., who
wrote a concurring judgment, by the latter: supra note 1, at 1032, 1003-1004 (S.C.R.),
231, 200-201 (D.L.R.), 519, 488-89 (C.C.C.).
74Id. at 1000 (S.C.R.), 210 (D.L.R.), 498 (C.C.C.) per Pigeon J.
75 Id. at 996 (S.C.R.), 206 (D.L.R.), 494 (C.C.C.).
76d. at 1954-59 (S.C.R.), 249-52 (D.L.R.), 537-40 (C.C.C.).
77 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 273, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 369, 107 C.C.C. 1.
7 8 Because it involved a private claim and the characterization of the main provi-
sions of the Act as criminal law was largely conceded, Pigeon J. was not prepared to
regard the case as conclusive of the issue.
79 Ex. parte Wakabayashi, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 226 at 234 (B.C.S.C.).
80 The preamble to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, 52
U.N.T.S. 151, to which Canada is a party and whose objectives the Act carries out,
refers to addiction to narcotics as "a serious evil for the individual and ... fraught with
social and economic danger to mankind": quoted by Pigeon J. in Hauser, supra note 1,
at 999 (S.C.R.), 209 (D.L.R.), 497 (C.C.C.). For an account of the concerns which
gave rise to the first narcotic control legislation in Canada, see Green, A History of
Canadian Narcotics Control: The Formative Years (1979), 37 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 42.
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-has long been regarded as a criminal law matter.81 The maximum penalty
under the Narcotic Control Act, life imprisonment, is not now exceeded by
any under the Criminal Code itself. 82 In light of these considerations, there
seems no need to reach beyond the enumeration in section 91(27) to the
residuary power to find the source of the Act's validity. 83
Pigeon J., however, writing for the majority in Hauser, found more per-
suasive a different characterization. He put forward two basic reasons for
regarding the Act as an exercise of the p.o.g.g. power. First, it was primarily di-
rected to the control, rather than the prohibition, of narcotic drugs.Y Second,
and in his view more important, it was legislation "adopted to deal with a
genuinely new problem which did not exist at the time of Confederation and
clearly cannot be put in the class of 'matters of a merely local or private
nature'."85
In support of the first reason, Pigeon J. referred to the fact that the
Act-as did the legislation which preceded it-contains provisions not only
for prohibiting drugs but also for their distribution and sale under conditions
prescribed by regulation. Though he did not say so specifically, the implica-
tion was clearly that the statute therefore lacked the essential formal attri-
butes of criminal law. The parallel he drew was with federal temperance
legislation. First in 188286 and again in 1946,817 the Canada Temperance
Act,88 which establishes a local-option scheme of prohibition, had been held
validly enacted under the p.o.g.g. clause.
In assessing the significance of the regulatory features of the Act, it must
be remembered that while section 91 (27) cannot be used to achieve primarily
regulatory purposes, "Parliament may determine what is not criminal as well
as what is, and may hence introduce dispensations or exemptions in its crimi-
nal legislation." 89 But Pigeon J.'s reliance on the temperance cases is perhaps
even more unsettling. When the Canada Temperance Act was held valid in
Russell v. The Queen,90 Canadian constitutional jurisprudence was in an
embryonic state. The Privy Council was not concerned in Russell with distin-
81 Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee, (1933) 47 B.C.R. 411, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 501, [1934]
1 W.W.R. 81(C.A.).
82 Under the Narcotic Control Act, life imprisonment is the maximum sentence for
trafficking (s. 4(3)) and for importing or exporting (s. 5(2)). Life imprisonment has
been the maximum penalty which may be levied under the Criminal Code since the
abolition of the death penalty for murder and treason by Criminal Law Amendment Act
(No. 2), 1974-75-76, c. 105.
83 Consistent with the p.o.g.g. power's residuary character, it has been the almost
invariable practice not to resort to it until the potential of the enumerated powers has
first been exhausted: supra note 45, at 244.
84 Supra note 1, at 998 (S.C.R.), 208 (D.L.R.), 496 (C.C.C.).
8 5 1d. at 1000 (S.C.R.), 210 (D.L.R.), 498 (C.C.C.).
8 8 Russell v. The Queen (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829, 46 L.T. 889, 2 Cart. 12 (P.C.).
87 A.G. Ont. v. Canada Temperance Fed'n, [1946] A.C. 193, [1946] 2 D.L.R. 1, 85
C.C.C. 225 (P.C.).
8 8 R.S.C. 1970, c. T-5.
8) Supra note 10.
00 Supra note 86.
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guishing between the possible sources of federal power; few of the distinctions
had been elaborated. Its basic conclusion, that the Act was not addressed to
a matter within provincial competence, was sufficient: under section 91,
Parliament can legislate "in relation to all matters not coming within the
classes of subjects ... assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the prov-
inces." When the Board expressed the view that laws such as the Temperance
Act "are of a nature which fall within the general authority of Parliament
to make laws for the order and good government of Canada,"' 1 it was there-
fore not using the phrase to describe a federal power separate from section
91 (27). Instead, as does the constitutional text itself,92 it was referring com-
pendiously to the legislative powers not granted to the provinces, among
which is found the power to enact criminal law. Indeed, the Board went on
to say that such laws "have direct relation to criminal law, which is one of
the enumerated classes of subjects assigned exclusively to Parliament,"03 and
in a case decided since Hauser, the Supreme Court of Canada has dealt with
Russell as the "traditional root of discussions" of federal criminal law
jurisdiction.
94
It was later decisions, and not Russell itself, which saw the case as estab-
lishing an independent federal p.o.g.g power.0 5 Its history in that capacity has
aptly been described as "chequered,"DO "extraordinary, and troubled",07 and
when it was expressly reaffirmed by the Privy Council in the Canada Tem-
perance Federation case,9 it was on the strength more of its longevity than
of its holding. But in relying on Russell, Pigeon J. has apparently resuscitated
it,99 and its significance for the scope of federal authority to regulate drug
use is considered further below.100
The second basis of the majority characterization of the Narcotic Con-
trol Act, the newness of the problem which the legislation addresses, is also
open to question. The criterion itself derives from the judgment of Beetz J.
in the Anti-Inflation Reference"'' where, supported by a majority of the
1 ld. at 839 (App. Cas.), 23 (Cart.).
92 A literal reading of s. 91 suggests that the p.o.g.g. clause confers the totality of
federal legislative power, and that the enumerations, referred to in the section as in-
cluded "for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing
terms of this section," merely illustrate its scope. That view has now largely been aban-
doned, for reasons discussed in Lysyk, Constitutional Reform and the Introductory
Clause of Section 91: Residual and Emergency Law-Making Authority (1979), 57 Can.
B. Rev. 531 at 539-43.
93 Supra note 86, at 839 (App. Cas.), 23 (Cart.).
04 Labatt Breweries, supra note 47, at 932 (S.C.R.), 618 (D.L.R.).
95 That understanding of the case was first put forward in A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can.,
[1896] A.C. 348, 74 L.T. 533, 5 Cart. 295 (P.C.) [hereinafter Local Prohibition case].
96 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 at 454, 68 D.L.R.(3d) 452
at 510, [hereinafter Anti-Inflation Reference].
07 Supra note 92, at 560.
98 Supra note 87.
99 Supra note 92, at 559.
10 0 See text accompanying notes 125-34, infra.
101 Supra note 96.
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Supreme Court on the issue, he advanced a new synthesis of the cases which
have considered the scope of the p.o.g.g clause. The view accepted by the
majority was that the opening words of section 91 confer on Parliament two
separate powers: a national emergency power, exercisable only on a tem-
porary basis, and permanent power to deal with "new matters or new classes
of matters." To come within federal authority, these new matters must have
certain additional characteristics; they must be "distinct subject-matters which
do not fall within the enumerated heads of s. 92 and which, by nature, are
of national concern."' 1 2 By implication, new matters of primarily local con-
cern come within the general provincial authority under section 92(16) in
relation to "matters of a merely local or private nature."
Taking the newness standard at face value, it is not altogether clear that
the problem of drug abuse passes the test. In the Anti-Inflation Reference,
inflation did not; it was characterized by Beetz J. as "a very ancient phenom-
enon,"'03 one of which the Fathers of Confederation were certain to have
been aware. The premise seems to be that the Fathers devised enumerated
powers sufficient to treat all social problems that could be anticipated in
1867, leaving to the residuary powers those which they could not then foresee.
Was drug abuse a foreseeable problem in the Canada of 1867? Appar-
ently drug use was not unknown, nor even addiction to narcotic drugs.
10 4
But the social attitudes which regarded the possession and sale of drugs as
harmful and deserving of punishment do not appear to have been formed
until later,105 and as Pigeon J. pointed out in Hauser,10 6 the first narcotic
control legislation was passed by Parliament only in 1908.10T It may be,
therefore, that despite the observation of Dickson J. that drug abuse, like
inflation, is "a very ancient phenomenon,"'08 its characterization as a "genu-
inely new problem" in Canada is a plausible one.
But even to answer the question in this way assumes that it is asked at
the relevant level of generality. It assumes, that is, that section 91(27) was
not a grant of the plenary power to control "socially undesirable conduct"'10 9
-that was hardly a new phenomenon-but only of the limited authority to
deal with the specific activities which, from the perspective of 1867, were,
or were potential, public evils. That assumption is impossible to square with
the accepted position that under its criminal law power, Parliament "can
make new crimes" of activities which were innocent or unknown at Con-
102 Id. at 457-60 (S.C.R.), 523-27 (D.L.R.).
103 Id. 458 (S.C.R.), 524 (D.L.R.).
104 Chapman, "Drug Usage and the Victoria Daily Colonist: The Opium Smokers
of Western Canada," in Knafla, ed., The Canadian Society for Legal History, Proceed-
ings 1977 (Toronto: Canadian Society for Legal History, 1977) 60 at 64-68.
105 Supra note 80, at 43-47.
2o Supra note 1, at 998 (S.C.R.), 208 (D.L.R.), 496 (C.C.C.).
107 An Act to prohibit the importation, manufacture and sale of opium for other
than medicinal purposes, S.C. 1908, c. 50.
108 Supra note 1, at 1059 (S.C.R.), 253 (D.L.R.), 541 (C.C.C.).
109 Supra note 10.
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federation;110 it also calls into question the constitutional underpinnings of
many provisions of the present Criminal Code."'
More generally, Pigeon J.'s focus on the newness of the particular prob-
lem seems, as does any consideration of newness as a classifying factor, at
odds with the essential nature of the federal division of powers. The allocative
formula of sections 91 and 92 does not distinguish between pre- and post-
Confederation phenomena;" 2 instead it assigns jurisdiction "in relation to
matters coming within ... classes of subjects" either predominantly national
or predominantly local in character, and then supplements the enumerated
classes with competing national and local residual powers." 3 A new matter
such as air transportation may not readily come within an enumerated class,
and may therefore be appropriate for allocation to a residuary power.114 It is
not its newness, however, which dictates this conclusion. Just as in any other
decision as to classification, it is a qualitative assessment whether it comes
within the possibly applicable classes." 5 All of the enumerations, including
section 91(27), exhibit the capacity to encompass new matters similar quali-
tatively to those of 1867.110
This preoccupation with the reasons in Hauser may seem by the way;
after all, the Supreme Court has decided, if only by a four to three majority,
that the Narcotic Control Act-and presumably, by implication, the con-
trolled and restricted drugs provisions of the Food and Drugs Act-is p.o.g.g.
legislation. But the vulnerability of the majority's conclusion is significant,
because it raises the possibility that like Russell, Hauser may eventually be
relegated to the status of a somewhat suspect authority.
There is already some indication that the Narcotic Control Act will still
be considered as deriving at least part of its validity from the federal criminal
law power. In Schneider v. The Queen,"17 a constitutional challenge was
brought to the British Columbia Heroin Treatment Act" 8 on the ground that
it trespassed on federal authority to control narcotic drugs. When the British
Columbia Court of Appeal overturned the trial judgment in which the Act
had been struck down, it did so having accepted "that the Narcotic Control
Act was enacted for the peace, order and good government of Canada and
110 Supra note 6.
111 Muldoon, The Queen v. Hauser: A Sage of the Old Federal Cougar and the
Provincial Sheep (1980), 10 Man. L.J. 301 at 304, citing as one example the wirb-
tapping provisions of the Criminal Code.
112 Supra note 92, at 564.
113 Abel, The Anti-Inflation Judgment: Right Answer to the Wrong Question? (1976),
26 U. Toronto L.J. 408 at 442-43.
14 Johannesson v. West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292 at 328, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 609
at 634-35, 69 C.R.T.C. 105 at 132-33.
115 See also, supra note 92, at 564-66, discussing the matter of nuclear energy.
116 See the discussion of progressive interpretation of the B.N.A. Act, supra note
45, at 96-98.
"17 [1980] 111 D.L.R.(3d) 632, 52 C.C.C.(2d) 321 (B.C.C.A.), rev'g 103 D.L.R.
(3d) 29 (B.C.S.C.). The case is discussed at text accompanying notes 179-213, infra.
318 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 166.
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that it may or may not also be supported as enacted in relation to the criminal
law ....
Undoubtedly the Supreme Court will eventually have to decide the issue
which it was able to evade in Hauser: whether Parliament can constitutional-
ly provide for federal prosecution of truly criminal offences. It will then have
to confront both Spence J.'s opinion, concurring in the result in Hauser, that
Parliament has authority over the enforcement of its laws whatever their
source in the B.N.A. Act,120 and the considerations of policy which buttress
that position.121 Should Spence J.'s views attract majority support, the im-
petus for the characterization of the Narcotic Control Act as p.o.g.g. legisla-
tion will disappear. In the interim, however, the implications of Hauser for
the scope of federal authority remain to be considered.
B. Implications of Hauser: The Present Scope of Federal Authority
The finding that a legislative matter comes within the p.o.g.g. clause
adds to the range of purposes for which the federal Parliament may legislate.
Federal legislation "in relation to" the matter so held will be valid legislation,
even though it touches upon matters otherwise committed to the provinces.1
2'
Nor are laws attributable to the p.o.g.g. clause subject to the formal or sub-
stantive constraints which limit the compass of the criminal law power. They
need not be prohibitory and punitive, but may be primarily regulatory in
character. 2 3 While they will presumably reflect a public purpose, that pur-
pose need not be grounded, as it must under section 91 (27), on the percep-
tion of some public evil.
124
It appears to follow that since the decision in Hauser, federal authority
to legislate concerning drug use is significantly broader than it was formerly
thought to be. But whether that is so may depend on just what was the
holding in Hauser. The majority judgment was much less explicit than it
might have been as to the identity of the matter which comes within the
opening words of section 91 so as to justify the Narcotic Control Act as legis-
lation for the peace, order and good government of Canada. Pigeon J. used
a variety of terms, each of which may signify a different ambit of authority:
"drug abuse", "drug control" and simply "[tihe subject matter of this legisla-
119 Supra note 117, at 640 (D.L.R.), 329 (C.C.C.). That the Act is attributable to
both powers is suggested by Pigeon J.'s reference to statutes "which do not depend for
their validity on head 27 of s. 91," Hauser, supra note 1, at 996 (S.C.R.), 206 (D.L.R.),
494 (C.C.C.). But it is difficult to see how an enactment can come within both an
enumerated power and a residuary clause, since the latter serves only where the effect
of the former has been exhausted.
12o Supra note 1, at 1004 (S.C.R.), 200 (D.L.R.), 488 (C.C.C.).
121 See text accompanying note 73, supra.
1
22 Supra note 45, at 244.
123 See, e.g., Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-3, regulating a matter held to come
within the p.o.g.g. clause in Johannesson, supra note 114.
12 4 Munro v. National Capital Comm'n, [1966] S.C.R. 663, 57 D.L.R.(2d) 753,
holding valid on the basis of the p.o.g.g. power a law for the development, regulation
and improvement of the national capital region.
19801
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
tion."' 5 In Schneider, the trial judge saw the case as holding more generally
that "narcotics" was now to be regarded as a new federal class of subject; 2 "
that characterization, which might be expanded to encompass other categories
of drugs, suggests an authority of virtually unlimited dimensions.
What may, however, help determine the breadth of federal power is the
analogy drawn in Hauser between drug control and temperance legislation.
Notwithstanding Russell, subsequent cases held federal control over alcohol
to be subject to important restrictions, and focussed on sections 92(13) and
(16) in recognizing the provinces as the primary regulators of the "liquor
traffic." In the Local Prohibition case,' 27 the Privy Council upheld a provin-
cial law establishing a local-option temperance scheme almost identical, apart
from its territorial limitation to the province, to the federal scheme which it
had held valid in Russell. Earlier, in Hodge v. The Queen,'2 8 the Judicial
Committee had sustained a provincial licensing system for regulating liquor
sales. Soon after Hodge, a comprehensive federal licensing statute known as
the McCarthy Act'2 0 was struck down. Though the Privy Council gave no
reasons for the decision, it was later explained that the Act was invalid
because it purported to regulate a local trade, a matter within exclusive pro-
vincial authority. 30 The purpose of the regulations-the Act's preamble
referred, among other things, to "the better preservation of peace and order"
-- does not appear to have been a relevant consideration; nor does there
appear to have been any exploration of the regulatory potential of the crimi-
nal law power.
This pattern of decisions suggests that federal authority to control liquor
through legislation pursuant to the p.o.g.g. clause is little different from what
it would be if Parliament had to rely on the criminal law power as its source
of legislative competence; it may in fact be narrower, once account is taken
of the flexibility now acknowledged to inhere in section 91(27). The
McCarthy Act case, for example, would seem to rule out a federal legislative
scheme that is substantially regulatory in character, and to provide support
for the conclusion that "Parliament does not have a truly general power with
respect to liquor legislation."' 31
But the legislative scheme held in Hauser to owe its validity to the
p.o.g.g. clause does contain a substantial regulatory and licensing compo-
nent;132 that was one of the two major reasons for Pigeon J.'s holding as he
did. Even though the federal-provincial division of powers was not directly
125Supra note 1, at 997, 998, 1000 (S.C.R.), 207, 208, 210 (D.L.R.), 495, 496,
498 (C.C.C.).
126 Supra note 117, at 61 (D.L.R.) (lower court decision).
127 Supra note 95.
128 Supra note 65.
129 The Liquor License Act, 1883, S.C. 1883, c. 30.
130 A.G. Can. v. A.G. Alta., [1916] 1 A.C. 588 at 596, 26 D.L.R. 288 at 292, 10
W.W.R. 405 at 408 (P.C.).
131 Supra note 16, at 919.
132 See text accompanying notes 48 and 51, supra.
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in issue, it is unlikely that these provisions of the Narcotic Control Act and
regulations would have escaped adverse comment had the McCarthy Act
case been considered as controlling; they would certainly have seemed sus-
ceptible to attack as regulating local trades or professions. It thus appears
that Hauser recognizes a federal competence in relation to drugs which goes
beyond that which the temperance analogy would indicate. 3 3 On balance,
given the emphases in the majority judgment, "the control of drugs" seems
the most apt description of this newly-identified authority.
The initial impression stated above therefore appears to be correct.
Though it was very probably unnecessary to resort to the p.o.g.g. power to
support the validity of the Narcotic Control Act, the Supreme Court of
Canada, having done so, has now likely authorized the enactment of federal
measures related to drugs which need not adhere to the criminal law model.
The formula of public purpose, prohibition and penalty should no longer be
the test of jurisdiction; what should govern instead is whether the law can be
characterized as directed to the control of drugs.
A federal treatment program, for example, should now be permissible as
a means of controlling future drug use, whether or not conviction of an
offence is a precondition for entry. That Parliament may relax the restric-
tions against certain drugs while maintaining regulation of their distribution,
through licensing or otherwise, should no longer be open to doubt. A federal
monopoly of drug production and distribution should equally be easier to
sustain as a control technique, absent the tension between criminal law and
regulation of trade.134 Though the Supreme Court has disapproved of the con-
tention that "a federal agency may lawfully be authorized to purchase in any
market and to dispose of its purchases as an ordinary trader,"'135 it did so in
a context in which federal power was restricted to the interprovincial market,
a restriction which does not apply to the p.o.g.g. power.
C. Exclusivity of Federal Authority
There is also the possibility that Hauser has not only enhanced the
authority of Parliament, but limited that of the provinces on the basis of
federal exclusivity. By definition, a decision that the matter of the control of
drugs comes within the p.o.g.g. clause would seem to preclude provincial
legislation by adding drug control to the list of "distinct subject-matters which
do not fall within any of the enumerated heads of section 92 and which, by
nature, are of national concern."' 36 Concluding his judgment in Hauser,
Pigeon J. specifically stated that "the subject-matter of this legislation is thus
133 But see, supra note 92, at 562, suggesting the temperance cases as still con-
trolling the scope of the p.o.g.g. power.
134 In this respect, however, the position may not be much different from what it
would be if only s. 91(27) could be brought to bear, since distribution on the premise
that no real control was necessary would presumably undercut the validity of the system.
135 Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 at 1292,
84 D.L.R.(3d) 257 at 323 per Pigeon J.
130 Anti-Inflation Reference, supra note 96, at 457 (S.C.R.), 524 (D.L.R.) per
Beetz J.
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properly to be dealt with on the same footing as such other new develop-
ments as aviation ... and radio communications . .. 1 Both the Privy
Council and the Supreme Court of Canada have indicated that "the whole
field of legislation in regard to aerial navigation belongs to the Dominion,""'
and the Supreme Court has on two recent occasions emphasized that broad-
casting is not a matter which can be separated out into national and local
components so as to permit partial provincial regulation.1 0 It might therefore
be concluded that the provinces now lack authority to legislate concerning the
control of drugs whether or not Parliament has legislated to the full extent
of its competence.
Strictly speaking, that conclusion is probably correct, just as it was
correct to say that provinces may not enact statutes that come within the class
criminal law. But it is doubtful that the holding that federal drug control
legislation comes within the p.o.g.g. clause now precludes the provinces from
exercising their own powers in a manner that may touch upon the control of
drugs, or in other words, that it has ousted the application of the aspect doc-
trine. In the Anti-Inflation Reference, Beetz J. described the practical effect
of the p.o.g.g. power (in situations other than emergency) as one of adding
new classes of subjects to section 91.140 Assuming that to be the case, the
aspect doctrine should apply to the new class drug control as it does to any
other.
Where provincial legislation has been foreclosed, there have invariably
been functional considerations which have precluded divided control.141 Pro-
vincial restrictions on airport location, for example, could not be tolerated
because of their impact on the national air transportation network. 142 Pro-
vincial licensing of cable television operators, similarly, would be inconsistent
with "what is functionally an interrelated system of transmitting and receiv-
ing television signals.' u43 In each case, it was an integral element of federal
competence that the provinces were purporting to regulate,' 44 and to charac-
terize the regulations as "in relation to" aeronautics and broadcasting would
not have been out of place.
Despite the concluding direction in Hauser, the parallel with drug con-
trol does not appear to be obvious; it is difficult, particularly in the absence
of any explanation by Pigeon J. as to why the matter should be considered
137Supra note 1, at 1000-1001 (S.C.R.), 210 (D.L.R.), 498 (C.C.O.).
138 Reference re the Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] A.C.
54 at 77, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 58 at 70, [1931] 3 W.W.R. 625 at 638 (P.C.); Johannesson,
supra note 114, at 310 (S.C.R.), 622 (D.L.R.), 119 (C.R.T.C.).
130 Capital Cities Communication Inc. v. C.R.T.C., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, 81 D.L.R.
(3d) 609, 36 C.P.R.(2d) 1; Public Service Bd. v. Dionne, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 191, 83
D.L.R.(3d) 178, 38 C.P.R.(2d) 1.
140 Supra note 96, at 458 (S.C.R.), 514 (D.L.R.).
141 Supra note 113, at 432.
142 Johannesson, supra note 114.
143 Dionne, supra note 139, at 197 (S.C.R.), 181 (D.L.R.), 9 (C.P.R.) per Laskin
C.J.C.
144 Cf. Montcalm Const. v. Minimum Wage Comm'n, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 754 at 768-
69, 93 D.L.R.(3d) 641 at 652-53, 79 C.L.L.C. 15,144 at 15,145 per Beetz J.
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one of national concern, 145 to identify an inviolable core of federal compe-
tence in relation to the control of drugs. As a criterion for the allocation of
power, "national concern" means more than a nation-wide awareness of a
problem giving rise to demands for a response. 14 Normally, a decision that
a matter comes within the p.o.g.g. clause has been accompanied by reference
to considerations making provincial jurisdiction either impractical or danger-
ous.147 Such considerations might have been put forward in Hauser; for ex-
ample, the international and interprovincial scale of drug distribution. But
they do not appear to be considerations of the sort which should preclude
legislation aimed at aspects of the problem within provincial competence.
Perhaps a better comparison is with the authority of Parliament to de-
velop, conserve and improve the national capital region. 148 That, too, has
been held to be an exclusive federal matter coming within the p.o.g.g. clause
in its non-emergency capacity, but the effect of so holding has been more to
validate federal legislation than to suppress that of the provinces. Provincial
municipal and planning legislation continues to apply to the region as an
ordinary exercise of provincial authority under section 92(8) 149 and (13) ,150
even though it includes among its aims the enhancement of the amenity of
theregion.
Even in the area of broadcasting, the aspect doctrine has recently been
permitted to operate. Having upheld federal programme content regula-
tions as "inseparable from regulating the undertaking through which pro-
grammes are received and sent on,"'151 the Supreme Court nonetheless held in
Kellogg'sa52 that a provincial consumer protection law could apply so as to
prohibit forms of advertising on television. Among the factors which the
Court pointed to in coming to this conclusion was that the prohibition was
directed at the advertiser rather than the broadcaster. Of course, the distinc-
tion's functional significance is minimal; but it demonstrates the Court's reluc-
tance to give federal authority preclusive effect where to do so can be
avoided.
Finally, there is the example provided by the liquor cases. As has al-
ready been indicated, the decision in Russell by no means precluded the
provinces from enacting their own liquor laws for "the abatement or preven-
tion of a local evil.' 53 Nor has it prevented them from using their other
145 He addressed the point by saying only that the problem dealt with by the
Narcotic Control Act "clearly cannot be put in the class of 'matters of a merely local or
private nature' ": supra note 1, at 1000 (S.C.R.), 210 (D.L.R.), 498 (C.C.C.).
146 Supra note 113, at 432.
'47 Gibson, Measuring "National Dimensions" (1976), 7 Man. L.J. 15 at 33-36.
148 Munro, supra note 124.
149 "Municipal institutions in the Province."
150 "Property and civil rights in the province."
151 Capital Cities Communications Inc., supra note 139, at 162 (S.C.R.), 623
(D.L.R.), 16 (C.P.R.) per Laskin C.J.C.
152 A.G. Que. v. Kellogg's Co. of Canada, 1978] 2 S.C.R. 211, 83 D.L.R.(3d) 314.
153 A.G. Man. v. Manitoba Licence Holders' Assn, [1902] A.C. 73 at 78 (P.C.).
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powers for purposes related to the control of liquor. 54 Though these cases
may share Russell's taint, they must be considered to be relevant since Pigeon
J.'s reliance on the liquor analogy in Hauser.
There is therefore some justification for concluding that Hauser has not
significantly restricted the room which remains for provincial laws relating
to drugs. As will be seen below, that was also, in effect, the conclusion of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Schneider v. The Queen.'5
D. "Decriminalization"?
It should not be thought that the Hauser decision has somehow had the
effect of "decriminalizing" federal drug offences. There is increasing recogni-
tion that an offence need not be criminal in the constitutional law sense of
coming within section 91 (27) to be criminal in any other meaningful sense;' 0
that is, to be criminal in respect of the principles of liability, the severity of
the penalties or the stigma of conviction.
Much of the discussion of the term's two meanings has focussed on the
criminal (in the second sense) character of offences enacted by the prov-
inces. But the Supreme Court has also suggested a distinction between
Criminal Code and other federal offences from the point of view of criminal
responsibility: for Code offences, proof of mens rea or guilty knowledge will
ordinarily be required, while for other offences, it may not.157 For drug
offences, however, the issue of the applicability of mens rea was decided in
1957 in Beaver v. The Queen.158 There the Supreme Court held that offences
under the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act-the predecessor of the Narcotic
Control Act-were in fact true criminal offences, so that proof of mens rea
was essential to a conviction.
The decision in Hauser should not disturb that conclusion, based as it
was on the quality of the offences rather than their constitutional categoriza-
tion. Obviously, Hauser did nothing to affect the severity of the penalties
under either the Narcotic Control Act or the Food and Drugs Act. And as
the Le Dain Commission rightly observed, "the general approach of the legis-
lation and law enforcement towards a particular offence, and especially the
relative seriousness of the penalties imposed, will, together with public atti-
154 See, e.g., Brewers and Maltsters' Ass'n of Ontario v. A.G. Ot., [1897] A.C. 231
(P.C.), upholding a provincial statute for the licensing of brewers and distillers on the
basis of the provincial taxation (s. 92(2)) and licensing (s. 92(9)) powers. In view of
the breadth of provincial authority to combat liquor as a local evil, it has rarely been
necessary to rely on other powers for liquor-related legislation. See, e.g., Benson and
Hedges (Canada) Ltd. v. A.G.B.C. (1972), 27 D.L.R.(3d) 257, [1972] 5 W.W.R. 32
(B.C.S.C.), holding valid restrictions against liquor advertising.
5 Supra note 117.
156R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 85 D.L.R.(3d) 161, 40
C.C.C.(2d) 353; R. v. Prue, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 547, 96 D.L.R.(3d) 577, 46 C.C.C.(2d)
257; Strasser v. Roberge, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 953, 103 D.L.R.(3d) 193, 50 C.C.C.(2d) 129.
15
7 Prue, id. at 553 (S.C.R.), 580-81 (D.L.R.), 260-61 (C.C.C.).
158 [1957] S.C.R. 531, 118 C.C.C. 129.
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tudes, determine the degree of stigma resulting from conviction."'159 Hauser
has altered none of those factors.
IV. OTHER FEDERAL POWERS
A. Health
Though health is one of the public purposes which will support federal
legislation as criminal law, it has occasionally been suggested that Parliament
possesses, in addition, an independent general health jurisdiction. The sug-
gestion was made most recently in the Labatt Breweries case, where Estey J.,
without reference to authority, stated that "Parliament may make laws in
relation to health for the peace, order and good government of Canada.... -160
Certainly there is little basis for such a power in the federal enumerated
classes. Only section 91 (11) touches on matters of health; it confers authori-
ty in relation to "quarantine and the establishment and maintenance of ma-
rine hospitals." What little judicial discussion there has been of this provision,
together with the context in which it appears, points to the conclusion that
the only kind of quarantine which it authorizes is "the detention of ships and
immigrants arriving at Canadian ports from other countries."' 0 '
Though the issue has never been squarely addressed in a considered
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada,162 jurisdiction otherwise in rela-
tion to health has, with few exceptions, been held or assumed to fall to the
provinces. 63 Under the B.N.A. Act, there is specific provincial authority in
relation to "the establishment, maintenance, and management of hospitals,
asylums, charities and eleemosynary institutions in and for the province, other
than marine hospitals.' 064 But when the question of health jurisdiction was
first judicially considered in a series of cases arising out of the outbreak of
smallpox, the courts looked beyond the institutional emphasis of section
92(7); reliance was largely placed on section 92(16), and a broad provincial
authority supported on the ground that health was a matter of "a merely local
or private nature in the province." 65 That allocation seems in harmony with
the understanding of the Fathers of Confederation, particularly since health
159 Supra note 16, at 916. A conviction under the Narcotic Control Act or Food
and Drug Act is still subject to the pardon provisions of the Criminal Records Act,
R.S.C. 1970 (Ist Supp.), c. 12.
1O Supra note 47, at 934 (S.C.R.), 619 (D.L.R.).
101 McConnell, Commentary on the British North America Act (Toronto: Mac-
millan, 1977) at 201. See also Lajoie and Molinari, Partage Constitutionnel des Com-
pdtences en Matire de Santj an Canada (1978), 56 Can. B. Rev. 579 at 585; supra note
16, at 923.
102 Its formal resolution seems to have been preempted by the federal spending
power and by intergovernmental agreements: Lajoie and Molinari, supra note 161, at 590.
163 See, e.g., Municipalit du Village Saint-Louis da Mile End v. La citg de Montrial
(1886), 2 M.L.R. 218 (S.C.); Re George Bowack (1892), 2 B.C.R. 216. The exceptions,
apart from the Labatt case, supra note 47, are listed, Lajoie and Molinari, supra note 161,
at 600-601.
164 B.N.A. Act, s. 92(7).
165 See, e.g., La Municipaliti du Village Saint-Louis du Mile End, supra note 163.
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was then assumed to be primarily of private concern, and state involvement,
to the extent it existed, was administered through local government.1 10
It is difficult to appreciate how there can at the same time be a general
federal health power attributable to the p.o.g.g. clause. Section 92(16) is
that clause's provincial counterpart as a source of unenumerated authority,
and is equally a source of general authority in relatioh to matters coming
within it. A matter which is primarily local in nature so as to come within
section 92(16) cannot subsequently be separated out into local and national
components for the purpose of dividing jurisdiction.1' 7 Federal power to
respond to a national emergency which threatens health stands on a different
footing; an "epidemic of pestilence" has been judicially referred to as instance
when the emergency side of the p.o.g.g. power could justifiably be invoked.10 8
But apart from situations of emergency, it is very doubtful that there is a
federal health power other than under section 91 (27) that is available to
sustain legislation relating to drugs.
B. Trade and Commerce
The federal trade and commerce power' 69 is primarily a power to regu-
late interprovincial and international trade; local markets are in general
preserved for provincial jurisdiction.170
If necessary, Parliament's international trade authority could be called
on to validate legislation prohibiting the import of drugs into Canada, as it
was in respect of the import of margarine when the criminal law justification
for the prohibition disappeared.' 7' Similarly, its authority in relation to inter-
provincial trade could probably be relied on as a constitutional basis for
regulating or prohibiting the flow of drugs between provinces, as it was,
together with the p.o.g.g. power, in the case of liquor.172
Otherwise, section 91 (2) appears to offer little or no assistance to fed-
eral legislative competence relating to drugs. It will not support national
product standards which cannot be justified on criminal law grounds; 1 8 nor,
as indicated above, will it authorize a federal presence in local markets as a
drug supplier or distributor.'
7 4
160 Can., Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ro-
well-Sirois Report), Book 11 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1940) at 32-33, cited in McKall,
Constitutional Jurisdiction over Public Health (1975), 6 Man. L.J. 317 at 317.
107 Supra note 161, at 592, 601.
1G8 Toronto Electric Comm'rs v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396, 2 D.L.R. 5, [1925] 1
W.W.R. 785 (P.C.).
109 B.N.A. Act, s. 91(2).
170 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96, 1 Cart. 265 (P.C.).
171 Supra note 9.
'7" Gold Seal Limited v. Dominion Express Co. (1921), 62 S.C.R. 424, 62 D.L.R.
62, [1921] 3 W.W.R. 710.
173 Labatt Breweries, supra note 47.
174 Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, supra note 135.
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C. The Treaty Power
Canada has been a party to a series of international agreements on drug
control, most recently the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.175
Though it is the federal government which is the signatory to these agree-
ments, and they impose obligations in respect of the control of drugs on states
which adhere to them, the agreements are of no significance in determining
the distribution of legislative authority within Canada. The federal treaty
power is a treaty-making power only; and while treaty provisions may be
referred to, as they were in both Hauser17 and Schneider,177 in ascertaining
a law's true purpose, the implementation of Canada's international obliga-
tions is left to the level of government which, in the absence of the agreement,
would have authority over the matters governed by it.178
V. THE PROVINCIAL HEALTH POWER
A. Treatment Legislation: Schneider v. The Queen
The authority of a province to establish a compulsory treatment pro-
gram for drug users was considered recently in Schneider v. The Queen,179
in which a class action was brought to challenge the constitutionality of the
British Columbia Heroin Treatment Act.180 The Act was passed in 1978,
following the submission to the provincial Minister of Health of a report,
prepared by the British Columbia Alcohol and Drug Commission, entitled
A Plan for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Heroin Users in British
Columbia.'81
The report reviewed in some detail the incidence of heroin addiction in
the province, emphasizing that British Columbia has consistently had the most
serious heroin use problem in Canada. 18 2 It catalogued the consequences,
including substantial drug-related crime' 83 and the overloading of the criminal
justice system, 8 4 and attempted to itemize the associated costs. 18 5 Existing
voluntary treatment programs, it concluded, were largely unsuccessful; they
were reaching no more than a small proportion of heroin users. 186 After men-
175 March 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151.
176 Supra note 1, at 999 (S.C.R.), 209 (D.L.R.), 497 (C.C.C.) per Pigeon J. and
1056 (S.C.R.), 250 (D.L.R.), 538 (C.C.C.) per Dickson J.
17' Supra note 117, at 640 (D.L.R.), 328 (C.C.C.).
178 A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
179 Supra note 117.
180 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 166. The action was brought on behalf of "all persons in the
Province of British Columbia who are or may be psychologically or physically de-
pendent on a narcotic."
181 (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1977).
182 Id. at 28.
183 Id. at 18.
184 Id. at 17.
185 Id. at 23-24. The monetary costs were those of the criminal justice system and
research, treatment and rehabilitation. It referred as well to the "immeasurable' costs
of social services, business losses and "the loss of a sense of personal security."
188 Id. at 26.
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tioning a number of possible governmental responses to the problem, the
report outlined and recommended the implementation of "a Health Entry
Plan which, through Health legislation, will require any heroin user so iden-
tified to undergo treatment and community support and supervision for a
stated period of time."'
87
There are several compulsory features to the plan of treatment which the
Heroin Treatment Act authorizes. The duration of individual treatment pro-
grammes is fixed at three consecutive years. 18 While the elements of a pro-
gramme are otherwise left to the discretion of a director appointed for the pur-
pose of the Act, there is specific authority to require detention in a treatment
centre for up to six months and attendance at a treatment clinic for up to one
year, and both periods can be extended on the order of a board of review. 8'
As for entry into treatment, the Act provides that it occur at the instance
of a peace officer.'90 Where a peace officer believes on reasonable grounds
that a person has a dependency on a narcotic-defined as "a state of psycho-
logical or physical dependence, or both, on a narcotic following its use on a
periodic or continuous basis"' 91-he may require the person to submit to
medical and psychological examination, under detention if necessary, by an
evaluation panel comprising at least two medical practitioners and one other
person.192 If the panel unanimously concludes that the person is in need of
treatment for narcotic dependency, and the person does not consent to be
treated, an application must be made to the Supreme Court, which, if it is
satisfied that the person is in fact in need of treatment, must commit him for
treatment. 193 The Act also contains provisions making it an offence, among
other things, to resist, evade or escape detention, to fail to submit to an ex-
amination or provide blood or urine samples when required, and to fail to
comply with a requirement or direction made in connection with a programme
of treatment.' 4
The action was tried before McEachern C.J. who, in an exhaustive judg-
ment, held the Act to be beyond the power of the province. His principal
ground of decision was that properly construed, Hauser had allocated "the
larger field of narcotics"-"not the control or prohibition or restriction or
limitation of the distribution of narcotics for its own sake ... but also the
protection of the public, including addicts, from the consequences of drug use
or abuse"-to the exclusive authority of Parliament.'95 By analogy to aero-
nautics and broadcasting, a province "[could] not invade any part of that
187 d. at 75.
188 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 166, s. 5(2).
189 Id., ss. 5(2), 7.
190 Id., s. 13. Such provisions are common in provincial mental health statutes. See,
e.g., The Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 269, 510, as am. by S.O. 1978, c. 50, s. 5.
191 Id., s. 1.
192 Id., ss. 3, 4.
193 Id., s. 4.
194 Id., s. 16.
195 Schneider, supra note 117, at 59, 61 (D.L.R.) (lower court decision).
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field by attempting to employ a different technique." 196 The true matter of the
Heroin Treatment Act, just as of the Narcotic Control Act, was "narcotics,"
a matter which subsumed the treatment of addicts.
197
The Chief Justice went on to hold that the Act could also be charac-
terized as an invalid attempt to enact criminal law. Since it insisted on a fixed
period of treatment, and possibly detention, whether or not it proved neces-
sary, it could not be said to be health legislation. Rather, the province was
seeking to create a new crime, the crime of narcotic dependency. 198
Neither of these two characterizations of the Act-as "narcotics" or as
criminal legislation-prevailed in the British Columbia Court of Appeal. Un-
animously, the Court allowed the province's appeal and held the Heroin
Treatment Act to have been validly enacted.
The Court's reasons were succinctly stated by McFarlane J.A. The true
subject matter of the statute was "the establishment, management and admin-
istration of facilities and institutions for the purpose of terminating or dimin-
ishing use of or dependency on narcotics."' 99 Its compulsory features, seen
in context, were not intended to be punitive: "[a]lthough there may be occa-
sions when a person will be detained or treated contrary to that person's
desire, the object is nevertheless to treat and assist, not to punish." 200 It was
in no way required that persons being treated be detained, and treatment in
a drug-free hospital setting has been recognized as an effective method for
the treatment of addiction.2 1' As for the Hauser case, it could not be regarded
as preventing the province from exercising the powers vested in it under sec-
tion 92.202 The Act was valid as coming within the authority conferred by
sections 92(7), (13) and (16)..203
Some greater elaboration would have been helpful of the content of the
B.N.A. Act provisions which McFarlane J.A. relied on; but should the case
be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, -04 a reversal of the decision
would be surprising. It seems almost self-evident that authority in relation
to health should extend to treatment, and there is little doubt that in general,
this is so. In Fawcett v. Attorney-General for Ontario,20 5 the Supreme Court
held valid without serious question, on the basis of section 92(7), provincial
legislation providing for involuntary commitment to a mental institution.
Given the statute's institutional focus, there was no need for the Supreme
197 Id. at 61 (D.L.R.).
107 id. at 60 (D.L.R.).
108 id. at 69 (D.L.R.).
199 Id. at 641 (D.L.R.), 330 (C.C.C.) (B.C.C.A.).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 640 (D.L.R.), 329 (C.C.C.), referring to Resolution 11 of the United
Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.
202 Id. at 637 (D.L.R.), 326 (C.C.C.).
203 Id. at 641 (D.L.R.), 330 (C.C.C.).
204 The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on Nov. 17, 1980, after this article
had been prepared.
205 [1964] S.C.R. 625, 45 D.L.R.(2d) 579, [1965] 2 C.C.C. 262.
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Court to look beyond the specific provincial hospital power, but the more
general health authority under section 92(16) should also be available, if
necessary, to support provincial programmes of treatment.20
The appropriateness of limiting Hauser's preclusive effect has already
been suggested. In some respects, there is a parallel between the provincial
regulation held valid in Kellogg's"°7 and the scheme of the Heroin Treatment
Act: rather than being directed at the control of drugs per se, it is directed
at those who use them. But there is an additional reason, alluded to in
McFarlane J.A.'s observation that "[j]udges of this Province are surely aware
of the great amount of human suffering and degradation directly and in-
directly related to the abuse of heroin and other derivatives of opium...."
208
Hauser has held, of course, that drug control is a matter of national concern,
and it may therefore be-the issue is considered below2 0°-that it cannot also
constitute a "local evil" so as to support provincial legislation on that basis
alone. But it is another thing to say that where the impact of a problem is
uniquely felt at the level of a provincial community, the province is disabled
from pursuing objects such as treatment which are "themselves ... anchored
in the provincial catalogue of powers."'2 10
The crucial question in Schneider, therefore, was whether the Heroin
Treatment Act was in fact bona fide health legislation. By itself, the statute's
overall compulsory orientation is not enough to require a negative conclusion;
as Fawcett indicates, provinces are free to resort to compulsion to achieve
ends that are otherwise valid. The mandatory three year duration of a treat-
ment program is a stronger reason to doubt the genuineness of the statute's
concern for health, but in the final analysis it too does not undermine it. If
it could be said that treatment efforts are necessarily doomed to failure, then
the three year period could fairly be regarded as little other than a prison
sentence or (since detention is not mandatory) probation for the "crime" of
narcotic dependency. But even though there is good ground for pessimism as
to the outcome of any treatment programme for opiate dependence, 211 treat-
ment has by no means been universally rejected as an appropriate response to
addiction.21 2 In view of the incidence of recidivism, nor can requiring a fixed
period of treatment be considered indefensible, particularly since the nature
of an individual's program can be adjusted during the period to take account
of his circumstances. It must be remembered that an inquiry into the validity
of a law is not the same as an inquiry into its wisdom, and that there is in
200 It has also been suggested that civil commitment can be justified on the basis of
s. 92(13), "property and civil rights": Green v. Livermore, [1940] O.R. 381, 4 D.L.R.
678, 74 C.C.C. 240 (H.C.).
207 Supra note 152.
2 0 8 Supra note 117, at 635 (D.L.R.), 324 (C.C.C.) (B.C.C.A.).
209 See text accompanying notes 221-31, infra.
210 McNeil, supra note 60, at 683 (S.C.R.), 16 (D.L.R.), 333 (C.C.C.) per Laskin
C.J.C. (dissenting).
211 See, e.g., .upra note 16, at 147-49.
212 d.
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A provincial legislature may validly enact prohibitions and punish those
who violate them, so long as the purpose of the prohibition comes within
section 92.214 As has already been mentioned, the Supreme Court has in two
recent decisions expressly reaffirmed that provinces may invoke their penal
authority even against activities also governed to some degree by federal
prohibitory legislation.
215
Provincial laws prohibiting the possession of LSD have twice come be-
fore appellate courts, with conflicting results; 216 both cases anteceded Hauser,
and dealt with the issue as a clash between provincial health and federal
criminal law jurisdiction. Notwithstanding Hauser, there still seems no reason
in principle why provinces should be incompetent to deal with the health
consequences of drug use by means of prohibitions, providing that is their
genuine purpose.21
7
Of course, so long as existing federal laws remain in effect, there is little
incentive for provinces to enact a duplicate set of prohibitions, particularly
since they would be prevented from coming into operation by the doctrine of
federal paramountcy, which provides that provincial laws must give way to
federal in the event of conflict between them. 218 However, should federal
prohibitions be withdrawn, the ability of the provinces to replace them would
be a matter of much greater relevance.
C. The Health Professions
The regulation of professions, including the health professions, comes
within the jurisdiction of the provinces.219 In the exercise of that jurisdiction,
213 Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (3d ed. rev. Toronto: Carswell, 1969) at
189. The Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, App. III, does not apply to provincial laws.
2 14 McNeil, supra note 60, at 697 (S.C.R.) per Ritchie J.
215 Id.; Dupond, supra note 62.
2 1
6R. v. Snyder (1967), 61 W.W.R. 112 (Alta. S.C.), aff'd 61 W.W.R. 576 (C.A.)
(law held valid); R. v. Simpson (1968), 1 D.L.R.(3d) 597, [1969] 3 C.C.C. 101
(B.C.C.A.) (law held invalid).
217 Determining whether there is in truth a health purpose would present a typical
problem of constitutional characterization. The liquor cases are not relevant to this issue
since the purpose of liquor statutes has generally been held to be not health but the
"local [moral] evil" of liquor; see text accompanying notes 221-31, infra. However,
provincial liquor prohibitions have been regularly sustained; see, e.g., R. v. Osform
(1927), 22 Alta. L.R. 582, [1927] 3 D.L.R. 1018, 49 C.C.C. 1 (C.A.).
218 The question of conflict only arises when both laws are independently valid.
For a recent example of a provincial prohibition ceasing to operate where it duplicated
a federal prohibition, see McNeil, supra note 60, at 698-99 (S.C.R.), 27-28 (D.L.R.),
345 (C.C.C.) where the separate questions of validity and conflict were, however,
confused.
219 Re Levkoe and the Queen (1977), 18 O.R.(2d) 265, 37 C.C.C.(2d) 356 (Div.
Ct.). The authority derives from s. 92(13) ("property and civil rights") under which
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it is open to the provinces to regulate the manner in which medical practi-
tioners and pharmacists may prescribe, dispense and administer drugs. 220 This
is yet another illustration of the aspect doctrine; as was mentioned above,
the regulations under both the Narcotic Control Act and the Food and Drugs
Act also contain stipulations concerning the medical use of drugs. In the
event of conflict between the federal and provincial regulations, the former
of course prevail by virtue of federal paramountcy.
VI. DRUG USE AS A "LOCAL EVIL"
The proposition was first put forward in the temperance cases that the
provinces have an independent general authority, apart from their other, more
specific heads of jurisdiction, to legislate for "the abatement or prevention of
a local evil."'221 Attributed to section 92(16), this was the authority ultimate-
ly relied on to support provincial legislation for regulating, and even pro-
hibiting outright, the liquor traffic.22 Although the Privy Council never really
elaborated on the nature of the local evil, it seems fairly clear that it was a
moral evil which the legislation was enacted to combat..
22 3
In somewhat different terms, the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of
provincial legislation for similar ends in B~dard v. Dawson.224 There it up-
held a Quebec statute providing for the closing of houses used as "disorderly
houses," proof of which was a conviction under the Criminal Code, on the
basis that provinces could validly legislate for "suppressing conditions cal-
culated to favour the development of crime. '2 5
Neither of these powers, as independent bases of authority rather than
merely considerations impelling the exercise of authority otherwise specifically
conferred, is easy to reconcile with the B.N.A. Act's scheme for dividing
legislative competence. It does not use "localness" in a geographic but in a
qualitative sense,220 and assigns both the power to suppress moral evils and
the power to prevent them to Parliament in section 91(27). The existence
of both powers was therefore apparently disavowed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in a series of cases in the 1950's. 227
However, both have now been revived in the decisions in McNeil228 and
Dupond, 2 9 and though the provincial health power should afford an ade-
other forms of business regulation are carried out, and perhaps also from ss. 92(9)
(licensing) and (16) (local matters, including health).
220 See, e.g., The Health Disciplines Act, S.O. 1974, c. 47, ss. 148-61.
221 Manitoba Licence Holders' Ass'n, supra note 153.
222 It had earlier been suggested in the Local Prohibition case, supra note 95, that
s. 92(13) might be the relevant constitutional provision.
223 Supra note 16, at 931.
224 [1923] S.C.R. 681, 4 D.L.R. 293, 40 C.C.C. 404.
225 Id. at 684 (S.C.R.), 297 (D.L.R.), 407-408 (C.C.C.) per Duff J.
226 Supra note 113, at 435-3 6.
227 See, e.g., Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285, 7 D.L.R.(2d) 337, 117 C.C.C.
129; Johnson v. A.G. Alta., [1954] S.C.R. 127, [1954] 2 D.L.R. 625, 108 C.C.C. 1.
228 Supra note 60.
229 Supra note 62.
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quate ground from which to legislate concerning drug use, both may now be
available as additional sources of authority. Given the correlation between
drug use and crime, crime prevention seems a goal which could be readily
invoked in connection with treatment or prohibitory legislation.
Whether drug use can now, in light of Hauser, be regarded as a local
evil may be more contentious. It is true that the temperance cases proceeded
on that basis despite the fact that the Privy Council had earlier cited the
national proportions of the evil posed by alcohol as justification for its deci-
sion in Russell.23" But what Russell represents is an application of the now
discredited geographic criterion for federal legislative power.231 The decision
in Hauser, unarticulated as it was on the issue of national versus local con-
cern, is not analogous: Pigeon J.'s choice of the p.o.g.g. clause over section
92(16) as the locus of the new problem of drug abuse can be regarded as a
conclusion that the constitutional significance of the problem is more than
merely local. Though Hauser does not preclude the provinces from exercising
powers which do not depend on such a characterization, it therefore does
appear to prevent the description of the drug problem as a local evil per se.
VII. CONCLUSION
What emerges from an examination of the competence to legislate con-
cerning drug use is a pattern of authority which permits both Parliament and
the provinces to prohibit, to regulate and to treat. There will be a tempta-
tion-amply justified, unfortunately, by unhappy experience-to see in such
a state of affairs yet another opportunity for costly, inefficient duplication.
23 2
But the presence of both levels of government in a single area of activity can
yield benefits as well: the benefits to be gained from approaching a problem
from a variety of perspectives and with a variety of legislative responses.
23
When it comes to the problem of drug abuse, there is certainly no monopoly
on solutions.
2 3 o Supra note 86, at 841 (App. Cas.), 25 (Cart.).
231 MacDonald, supra note 32, at 156 (S.C.R.), 19 (D.L.R.), 21 (C.P.R.) per
Laskin C.J.C.
232 Where actual duplication exists, it should be resolved by the paramountcy doc-
trine in favour of the federal legislation: Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon (1977),
16 O.R.(2d) 593 (Div. Ct.), aff'd (1978), 19 O.R.(2d) 516 (C.A.); McNeil, supra note
60, at 698-99 (S.C.R.), 27-28 (D.L.R.), 345 (C.C.C.). The Supreme Court has, how-
ever, been remarkably restrained in its application of paramountcy: supra note 45, at
103-11. For an indication that federal and provincial treatment regimes can co-exist,
see Fawcett, supra note 205.
233 See Simeon, Criteria for Choice (unpublished paper presented to the workshop
on the political economy of confederation, Kingston, 1978) at 14.
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